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side ourselves in search of blame for the world's being the way 
it is. We claim we have no voice because the patriarchy has 
drowned us out or gagged us with a dustcloth. We dismiss our 
inner voices as either internalizations of male language or as 
"gossip." 
Yet to label as "gossip" the unfamiliar voices that somehow 
seep through our gestapo-like, traditional linguistic filter is 
already to have internalizedpatriarchal language. Not to listen to 
the voices because they are unfamiliar is to have internalized the 
patriarchal value system as well. 
"Our customary literacy language is systematically gendered 
in ways that influence what we approve and disapprove of, 
making it extremely difficult for us to acknowledge certain kinds 
of originality" (Ostriker 3). Yet, even as feminists attempt to 
"make female speech prevail, to penetrate male discourse, to 
cause the ear of man to listen" (Ostriker 21 l), we continue to find 
our voices silenced both by the big, bad world out there - that 
we, of course, have nothing to do with perpetuating-and by our 
internalized selves that are really just slightly altered facsimiles 
of the outer world. 
After all, if our inner voices are somehow different from our 
learned outer voices, why do we continue to hear only theUvoices 
inside [us] that tell [us] to be quiet, the voices outside [us] that 
drown [us] out or politely dismiss what [we] say or do not 
understand [us], the silence inside [us] that avoids saying any- 
thing important even to [ourselves] (Annas 4)? 
Yet, if woman's voice is still silent, whether from internal or 
external censors, what is feminist criticism? What is feminist 
literary theory? What is different about the "different truths" 
(Gilligan 156) men and women have if we continue to privilege 
difference between genders, rather than traits, in order to define 
these truths? 
Academic feminists, warns Betsy Draine, especially need to be 
more aware that being able to write from "'a woman's position' 
about 'subjects of interest to women' in language that women 
recognize as their own is no guarantee that [women authors] 
understand the first thing about women outside their class or 
outside their publishers' readership of white, upper-middle- 
class, females in Britain, Canada, and the United States" (Draine 
A40). 
Indeed, it is interesting that silence is still a central theme of 
feminist theory even as feminists have begun creating their own 
canon, arather ironic predicament for a movement that originally 
sought to "dispel the idea of a fixed literacy canon, which served 
to insure for so long the virtual exclusion of women from literary 
history" (Draine A40). In our efforts to de-canonize knowledge 
and overcome our past of silence, have we not merely become si- 
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lencers ourselves? By making feminism 
another category, instead of changing the 
presupposed idea of categories, have we 
not become another exclusionary entity, 
inadvertently building more linguistic 
barriers even as we claim to be tearing 
them down? h the woman in the car next 
to you on the freeway more concerned 
with phallocentrism or the price of eggs? 
Does she have the faintest idea what de- 
constructed neo-post-modern, revisionist 
feminism is? If she doesn't know, does 
that make her a literate woman or an 
illiterate feminist? If, by chance, she does 
understand, is she then CO-literate, or is 
she now an illiterate woman and a literate 
feminist? 
is a literary as well as a social category. It 
is possible to argue for taking all texts 
seriously as texts without arguments 
based on social oppression of cultural 
exclusion, and popular genres have there- 
fore been studied as part of the female 
literary tradition ... But in a context where 
the ground of struggle - highly con- 
tested, moreover - concerns Edith 
Wharton's advancement to more major 
status, fundamental assumptions have 
changed very little" (1 16). It is ironic, of 
course, that, even as Robinson admits that 
"conclusions about 'women's fiction' or 
'female consciousness' have been drawn 
or jumped to from considering a body of 
work whose authors are alI white and 
the majority of data processors and burger 
burners are women, and that these facts of 
life have hardly been manufactured by 
female academicians seeking a market- 
able dissertation topic. Still, the female 
burger burner, more attuned to Janet 
Jackson than H&ne Cixous, should be 
able to ask the female academician, 
"What have you done for me lately?" and 
be answered a tad more specifically than, 
"Weare stealing the language and writing 
the body." 
The burger burner asks, "What can I 
be?" 
Julia Kristeva answers, "A woman can- 
not 'be'; it is something which does not 
even belong in the order of being" (137). 
F EMINISTS HAVE CEASED TO BE FEMI- 
NISTS IN ORDER TO STUDY FEMINISM. IN OUR ZEST TO DEFINE OURSELVES, WE 
HAVE FORGOTTEN THAT IT WAS THE TRADITIONAL DEFINITIONS OF WOMEN THAT 
ULTIMATELY LED TO OUR OUTRAGE. 
The point is that feminists have ceased 
tobe feminists in orderto study feminism. 
In our zest to define ourselves, we have 
forgotten that it was the traditional defini- 
tions of women that ultimately led to our 
outrage. We have merely replaced patri- 
archal definitions with feminist defini- 
tions. Refusing to admit that the process 
of defining, rather than definitions them- 
selves, is the true source of power. We 
fear that if we don't define ourselves we 
won't exist. The question is whether after 
twenty years of liberating ourselves from 
societally -enforced definitional confine- 
ment we have not begun to confine our- 
selves anew. 
This becomes especially interesting 
when pondered alongside the much her- 
alded crisis in literacy. If, in fact, we have 
begun to confine ourselves by our own 
definitions, have we not simultaneously 
begun to exclude the majority of the very 
sex we sought to make equally included in 
society? Have we not, even as Allan 
Bloom calls us "the latest enemy of the 
vitality of classic texts" (65), become just 
as elitist as the institutions we sought to 
make more equitable for everyone, re- 
gardless of gender, race or income? 
AsLillianRobinson points out, "'Elite' 
comparatively privileged' (1 14), she 
chooses Edith Wharton as her example, 
rather than Leslie Silko or Toni Morrison. 
I dare say that in our quest to create a 
"literacy" of our own, a feminist lan- 
guage, a feminist vision, a space where 
Catharine Stimpson says "women of lan- 
guage become richer, deeper, at once 
more enigmatic and more clear" (xii), we 
have done as much to perpetuate illiteracy 
as to create a new literacy. As Andrew 
Sledd aptly notes, "...literacy and illiter- 
acy develop together, defining each 
other" (493, while Robert Pattison 
claims "literacy must not be treated as a 
constant in human affairs but as an evolv- 
ing and adaptableattributeof the species" 
(18). As a result, Sledd contends that the 
much publicized crisis in literacy is actu- 
ally no crisis at all, "that both the crisis and 
the means to resolve it have been manu- 
factured" (495) by "a two-tiered educa- 
tional system producing ... a minority of 
over-paid engineers and managers to 
design technology and provide supervi- 
sion for a majority of docile data proces- 
sors and underpaid burger burners" (506). 
Feminists, of course, would be the first 
to point out that the majority of over-paid 
engineers and managers are men, while 
The single, working mother exclaims, 
"I feel like I'm going out of my mind." 
Sonia Johnson soothes her with, "Since 
truth is reversed in patriarchy, to go out of 
our minds is to become truly sane. (vi). 
Or perhaps a better example is a col- 
league's outrage at Women Who Love Too 
Much being placed in the feminist theory 
section at a bookstore. "Can you imag- 
ine?" Trash right next to important the- 
ory." No, I can't imagine. Have we 
become more concerned with writing the 
body than with protecting it from abuse? 
While these conversations make light 
of the barriers that exist between aca- 
demic and non-academic women, they 
show why many women, obviously with 
good reason, are "word-phobic and will 
even classify the written word as an in- 
strument of oppression that has too often 
been used against them - an echo of the 
theme of 'words as weapons"' (Belenky, 
et. al. 74). Indeed, feminists must begin to 
realize that while we may not have manu- 
factured a sexist society, we are, in fact, 
creating a two-tiered woman's society in 
which a minority of academically edu- 
cated women have begun to tell the major- 
ity of alternatively educated women what 
constitutes "woman." We have done 
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nothing to change the Aristotelian idea 
that to be literate about something is to 
understand its definition. Even as we still 
complain about being silenced, we have 
done nothing with our words to change 
the concept of what constitutes literacy. 
As a result, perhaps feminists should 
consider implementing a "dysfunctional 
literacy, for literacy itself guaranteed 
nothing" (Sledd499). SinceE.D. Hirsch 
has so graciously told us what every cul- 
turally literate person should know 
(Hirsch 146-215), perhaps feminists 
should consider advocating what we 
shouldn't know. We shouldn't know, for 
example, how to build a nuclear warhead. 
Or what constitutes "masculine" and 
"feminine." (After all, do masculine and 
feminine even exist if the major biologi- 
cal differencebetween men and women is 
genitalia? Will my clitoris enlarge if I am 
logical? Does a man's penis shrink when 
he cries?) In fact, perhaps that which we 
should most not know, is what we should 
know, for "the world is covered with signs 
that must be deciphered, and those signs, 
which reveal resemblances and affinities, 
are themselves no more than forms of 
similitude. To know must therefore be to 
interpret" (Foucault 32). 
Any act of defining what constitutes 
literacy, then, is merely the definer's in- 
terpretation, which may be futile to dis- 
cuss at all, "for there is no thing, literacy, 
only constellations of forms and degrees 
of literacy, shifting and turning as history 
rearranges the social formations in which 
they are embedded. Pieties about Liter- 
acy with a capital L ought to be scruti- 
nized: Which Literacy? Whose Literacy? 
Literacy for what?" (Sledd 499). Indeed, 
such questions can just as easily be ap- 
plied to feminism: Which feminism? 
Whose feminism? Feminism for what? 
Therein lies the parallel between issues of 
feminism and literacy, for to continue to 
privilege definition over interpretation is 
to perpetuate the domination cycle of our 
present culture. To continue to use the 
metaphor of silence to imply that women 
sre voiceless or that the general populace 
is illiterate is to continue to privilege 
~ommunication outside one's self, which, 
In effect, nullifies all inner voices, for they 
lo  not exist if they cannot be heard. 
I am not suggesting that women, mi- 
norities, and non-traditionally educated 
people have indeed not been maliciously 
silenced throughout history. But I do 
wonder if, like most groups that in- 
evitably become dominating in order to 
overcome being dominated, feminists 
haven't become extremists, ignoring "the 
silence in women" in which "anything 
that falls into it has an enormous rever- 
beration" (Duras 175). For example, as of 
August 28, Elizabeth Morgan's silence is 
still reverberating in the form of protec- 
tion for her daughter. Morgan, a plastic 
surgeon with degrees from Harvard, Yale 
andTufts (does that make her "literate?"), 
has spent the past year in a solitary cell at 
the District of Columbia Jail for refusing 
to divulge the whereabouts of her six- 
year-old daughter. Morgan hid her 
daughter rather than allow her ex-hus- 
band, who she claims has continually 
sexually molested her daughter, to have 
unsupervised visits with the child. 
As a result, the judge holding her in 
contempt of court has ruled that Morgan 
could remain in jail until her daughter 
turns eighteen. While incarcerated, Mor- 
gan has published a textbook on cosmetic 
surgery, written several short stories, and 
completed a children's book (Prasso 6). 
Like reporters who refuse to reveal their 
sources, her silence, rather than her com- 
munication, is what is being "censored." 
Perhaps, in our zest to be heard, we 
have "censored" our own silence as well. 
The pamarchy ran a blue light special, 
advertising "silence as ignorance," offer- 
ing two for one voices, and we shopped 
until we dropped. Somewhere along our 
supposed1 y liberated hermeneutic spiral, 
we stopped listening and started talking. 
Yet, as Marguerite Duras suggests, what 
isn't said can be just as powerful as what 
is. "I know that when I write there is 
something inside me that stops function- 
ing, something that becomes 
silent ... everything shuts off - the ana- 
lytic way of thinking, thinking inculcated 
by college, studies, reading, 
experience ... as if I were returning to a 
wild country" (175). Ultimately, to deny 
silence is to deny one's self, which, in the 
end, maybe the only concern about which 
one can be literate. If there is, indeed, a 
need to define literacy it is only because 
we have a need to define the self, for the 
literacy crisis "is finally a crisis of identity 
in which tests and television, schools and 
a blur of culture conspire" to create "a 
denial of self' (Wheeler 17). 
I believe feminists have not only a 
unique opportunity but a moral obligation 
to become more involved in the process of 
literacy, not to define it, but to keep it from 
being defined, no to limit it, but to con- 
tinue to expand its boundaries. It is not 
enough to encourage women to write the 
body; we must encourage all people to 
write the self. "Identity - a cube of ice, 
unmeltable, at the center of oneself, 
formed from all sorts of sources - is a 
force that allows every writer - even 
students of writing - to write well" 
(Wheeler 16)., 
Women, especially, who "have always 
been encouraged to take their opinions 
from others, to depend on others' ap- 
proval for their own sense of self-worth" 
(Hedges, Wendt 82), should be all the 
more conscious not only of what deter- 
mines ourselves, but also of what deter- 
mines the concept of self in general. It 
helps little to have a self, if that self is 
considered illiterate. It helps little if Vir- 
ginia Woolf is now accepted in the canon 
if the person who most needs to hear her 
voice cannot get into the university. It 
helps little to advocate writing the body if 
that body must conform to MLA style. it 
helps little to encourage the development 
of an imaginative self if our task is "to 
develop the reality principle, to enforce 
the status quo and equip the super ego 
with all its niggling conventions, down to 
and including, if possible, those of ortho- 
dox punctuation" (Sledd 503). 
Feminists need to be aware that while 
we are expanding what it means to be 
women, men such as Hirsch and Bloom 
are narrowing what it means to be literate. 
In Texas, as of 1989, all students at state- 
supported universities will be required to 
pass a competency exam in reading, writ- 
ing, and mathematics before being al- 
lowed to graduate. Once again the ques- 
tions proliferate: What constitutes com- 
petency? What constitutes reading? 
What constitutes writing? Who wiU con- 
struct the test and who will decide what it 
is supposed to validate? If the test is 
anything like the College Board's Test of 
Standard Written English, it will be 
"designed to distinguish on the basis of 
trivial dialect differences between the 
upper-middle class and working people. 
After all, college and its textbooks are not 
for everyone .... This may be good training 
for what life has in store, but it is not edu- 
cation" (Sledd 503). 
It is interesting that while the body of 
scholarship in feminist, Afro-American, 
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and Native American studies has in- 
creased in recent years, so has the number 
of standardized placement and com- 
petency exams. While we were defining 
our voice, those enamored of the status 
quo were defining our audience. While 
we have been developing the self, the 
patriarchy has been determining who can 
have one. 
The problem is they didn't expect us to 
have so many. You know how we women 
are - we never can make up our minds. 
So we have an intellectual self and a 
down-home mother self, a lover self, and 
a pseudo-self, a self created "in love and 
in joy, in sorrow and in despair, in re- 
sponse to the realities of [our] lives and as 
an expression of [our] dreams" 
(Hedges,Wendt 8). As such, "feminism 
has split again and again until it has be- 
come feminisms, a set of groups, each 
with its own ideology, identity, and 
agenda" (Stimpson xi$. 
Yet, in the same way feminist have 
learned to live with multiple meanings, so 
should we be the initiators of multiple 
literacies. Like feminism, literacy should 
be "beyond restoration." Feminist practi- 
tioners "are too numerous, too dissimilar 
in situation, for one agreement to accom- 
modate all the theories, ideas and percep- 
tions by and about women in the post- 
modem world. Thequestion is not how to 
paste and staple a consensus together 
again but rather how to live culturally and 
politically with fragmentation" 
(S tirnpson 191). 
Similarly, feminists, especially those 
of us in academe, should demand and 
implement the acceptance of fragmented 
literacies. Instead of trying to make the 
burger burner relevant to the canon, we 
should be finding ways to make the canon 
relevant to the burger burner. Instead of 
dutifully accepting policies for testing 
competency, we must actively promote 
diversity, recruiting from barrios and 
condos alike, challenging not only the 
tests themselves, but the idea that one test 
can somehow judge an infinite variety of 
people. We must pull ourselves away 
from our dusty bookshelvesand put activ- 
ism back in feminism. Ultimately "we 
must move form cultural explorations to 
explicit political practice" (S timpson 
1961, 
To overcome silence is not enough; we 
must allow silence to have its own Liter- 
acy. To write the body is not enough; we 
EMINISTS SHOULD DEMAND AND F 
IMPLEMENT THE ACCEPTANCE OF FRAGMENTED 
LITERACIES. INSTEAD OF TRYING TO MAKE THE 
BURGER BURNER RELEVANT TO THE CANON, 
WE SHOULD BE FINDING WAYS TO MAKE THE 
CANON RELEVANT TO THE BURGER BURNER. 
must write our minds and or dreams, our Hedges, Elaine, Ingrid Wendt. In Her 
run-on sentences, and our images that do Own Image. New York: Feminist 
not make sense, and do not have to. When Press, 1980. 
internalized patriarchal voice starts to 
criticize us, we can say, "You are merely Hirsch, E.D., Jr. Cultural Literacy. Bos- 
one of many." When we embrace our ton: Houghton Mifflin, 1987. 
many we embrace pluralism Johnson, Sonia. Going Out of OurMinds. 
rather than dualism, CO-existence rather Freedom, california: crossing 
than competition, a spectrum of color 1987. 
rather than black and white. Ultimately, 
when feminists embrace multiple litera- Kristeva, Julia. "Women Can Never Be 
cies, we embrace ourselves. Defined." New FrenchFeminisms. Ed. 
Elaine Marks and Isabelle de 
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